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Introduction
The importance of higher education institutions, such as universities, as well as the role that these play in the knowledge economy, cannot be overemphasised especially in the current economic climate. Universities exist to teach and to perform research. Universities add to the stock of useful knowledge through their research and disseminate that stock through their teaching, but what determines the amounts of each that they do ? We seek to answer that question in this paper and show how the 'culture' of a university system will systematically depend on the way that the higher education sector is funded (where 'culture' captures the emphasis placed on research and/or teaching). We do this by constructing a model in which the budget constraint facing the higher education sector plays a crucial role in determining the kind of research and teaching culture that will emerge. We use a generic type of funding model and, as we consider its parameters (speci…cally the premium for and the 'marginal cost'of research quality, as well as the threshold level of teaching quality), we …nd that one can obtain the emergence of cultural phenomena such as 'research elites'and the 'binary divide'. 1 Achieving quality in teaching and research takes time and as academics are time-limited, they face a stark choice. The more of their time that they spend on research, the higher is likely to be its quality. However this cuts back on the time that they can spend teaching students and, as this has implications for sta¤-student ratios, it can have a negative impact on teaching quality. Of course, in view of agencies such as the UK Quality Assurance Agency (QAA)as well as the increasing 'voice'of the student consumers, there is going to be some quality threshold in teaching that all universities will need to attain. We take account of this in our analysis.
In publicly funded systems, …nancial resources come as grants for teaching 1 The 'binary divide' refers to the di¤erentiation between 'polytechnic institutions' and 'universities'within the UK between 1965 and 1992, where only the latter could grant research degrees. This ended with the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 which created a uni…ed sector. A 'research elite' refers to groups of universities where a lot of emphasis is placed on the research function. and grants for research. While there is as yet no quality-related component to the grant for teaching, this is not true of research -at least in the UK, Australia and New Zealand since the advent of the periodic research evaluation exercises. 2 We have therefore allowed there to be a teaching grant proportional to the number of students that a university has on its books and a research grant with a …xed amount per sta¤ member and a quality-related component.
There is a minimum quality threshold above which the quality component kicks in and we explore what happens as the scale of this quality factor is varied.
There is a substantial literature in the economics of higher education (e.g., see Clotfelter (1999) ). However, this has tended to focus on the costs of and returns to higher education, often concentrating on issues associated with various …nancing/funding systems and their e¤ects on student participation as well as equity and welfare aspects (Barr and Crawford (1998) Despite this ‡urry of research, relatively little attention appears to have been paid to the question of the link between what universities actually do, in terms of both teaching and research quality, and the way in which they are funded. In view of the important role envisaged for universities in the "knowledge economy", particularly where they are supported by public funding, 3 it 2 In the UK research excellence has been evaluated until recently by the Research Assessment Exercises (RAE) of 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001 seems surprising that the link between the type of funding system and the mix of activities that universities undertake has not been explored in greater detail, with the exception of Del Rey (2001) . This paper analyses a stylised game between two universities that are competing for students in a Hotelling-like fashion What we seek to do in the present paper is to incorporate research quality directly into a university's budget constraint (a pivotal element of our analysis) and to provide a rather general modelling framework that allows universities to actively choose the quality of their teaching and research when faced with di¤erent funding systems. In particular, we derive feasible sets that face universities under di¤erent funding systems and show how, as the parameters of the funding system are varied, the nature of the university system changes. Thus we endogenise the 'culture'of the university system. We believe that in the current climate of the higher education sector, this is important if one is concerned with making comparisons with actual systems across di¤erent countries, especially in the UK, Europe, Australia and New Zealand.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and sets out the generic characteristics of a university funding system. Section 3 uses that framework to analyse how a typical university, operating under the funding limits described in Section 2 chooses teaching and research quality. Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We describe a higher education system in which there is a multitude of universities. 4 The characteristics of this system are as follows: [1] The minimum teaching quality is speci…ed by the funding authority.
Rather than specifying this directly, we capture this by the fraction of time, t < 1, that academics have to spend on teaching in order to meet this minimum requirement. Each academic is endowed with one unit of time to be used in research and/or teaching.
[2] Universities are funded under the mechanism, I = pS + AR(q), where I is a university's income, p is the unit of resource delivered by the system for teaching a student 5 , S is the number of students 6 , A is the number of academics, R(q) is the research funding per academic, and q is the quality of research produced by academics. Notice that we have chosen here not to relate 4 In this paper we stay away from inter-university competition and related issues of imperfect competition in higher education. These are not without interest but our focus here is on how the choice of teaching and research quality is a¤ected by various funding systems in the absence of competition. 5 In the UK this would be the sum of the teaching resource provided by the funding council through its TR grant and the tuition fee that a student pays. In other systems, this could be entirely funded by the student fee. 6 Note that we treat the population of students as a homogeneous group, i.e., we do not distinguish undergraduates from postgraduates. However, in later work, it would be interesting to consider separately how these two groups of students respond to changes in the funding mechanism and also on the quality of teaching and research provided.
funding to teaching quality. 7 [3] The research funding function R(q) takes the form:
where 0 is the lump-sum payment per academic, 0 is the research quality premium, and q 0 is the research quality threshold. This is quite general so that > 0; = 0 corresponds to a funding system without incentives while 0; > 0 corresponds to an incentivised system. A university funding system is then de…ned by the vector (t; p; ; ; q). In the analysis that follows we shall treat t and p as exogenous and will examine how di¤erent values of the remaining parameters determine the choice a university makes with respect to the teaching and research quality it o¤ers.
[4] Academics are identical in terms of teaching and research ability. 8 [5] Academics deliver a teaching quality at or above the minimum; this takes a fraction t t of their time. It follows then that the sta¤-student ratio, A=S, determines the amount of time academics have for research, and hence, through R(q), the quality of research. We summarise this relationship through the following function A S = g(q; t); @g @q > 0; @g @t > 0:
As each academic has one unit of time to spend on teaching and/or research, and, from above, it costs t units of academic time per student to achieve the speci…ed teaching quality, t. Thus, if a university has A academics and S students with A tS then the amount of time each academic can devote on research while achieving the minimum teaching quality is
The quality of research, q, is related to the time devoted to research, r, via the simple function q = r ; 0 < < 1, indicating diminishing returns to time spent on research. Then 1 t(S=A) = q , where = (1= ) > 1. As a result,
Academics are paid a …xed salary, w > 0. This salary w is independent of q thus enabling universities to enforce a target level of quality on teaching.
[7] There are no other sources of income for universities so that the salary bill for academics is the only cost. Consequently a university faces a budget constraint wA pS + A + max[0;] :
Notice that using the relationship in expression (1) we can re-write this as:
or (per student),
For the particular form given in (1 0 ) above this becomes: We allow the possibility that universities may di¤er in their views as to the relative importance of teaching and research and so may have di¤ering objective functions within this class. Notice that, by substituting (1) we can write this as
which, for given, S, is a strictly increasing function of t and q. Indeed, in the special case where U (:) is homothetic, this can be written:
V (q; t; S) = (t; q) (S):
In the interest of analytical tractability, in what follows we will use the homothetic functional form and moreover will restrict our attention to the case
where !, 0 ! 1 is the relative weight that a university places on research.
Note that ! is the characteristic that di¤erentiates universities.
Analysing the Budget Constraint
We now examine what options are open to a university that is constrained by the budget constraint as de…ned by (3 0 ). To do this, suppose for the moment that a university is delivering the minimum teaching quality, and consider what research quality it can achieve. Then (3 0 ) becomes
and represents the funding constraint faced by a university when it o¤ers the minimum teaching quality, i.e., t = t (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the constraint Figure 1 : A university delivering the minimum teaching quality: two cases Notice that the LHS of (4) is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of research quality, q , that takes the value w p t when q = 0 and the value w when q = 1. It has a simple interpretation: it is the resource per academic that is needed to deliver research of quality q when the quality of teaching is at its minimum threshold level. The RHS of (4) is a piecewise linear function that takes the value when 01 and the value + (1 q) when q = 1.
It also has a simple interpretation: the resource per academic that is actually delivered by the funding system for research of quality q. Clearly, if research of any given quality is to be achieved, the resources must be at least su¢ cient to meet the needs. In fact we will make two further assumptions:
The university funding system is such that there exist some q 2 [0; 1] such that w p t + p t q > + max[0;]: Assumption 2 (a2).
The university funding system is such that there exist some q 2 [0; 1] such that (4) is satis…ed.
If (a1) were not satis…ed then the range of values of q that satisfy (4) is the entire interval [0,1], and so universities would face no e¤ective restriction on the quality of research they can achieve. In other words by invoking (a1) we are ruling out the possibility that universities are so generously funded that they face no constraints on research quality! One immediate implication of (a1) is that w. This is inherently plausible -university funding systems do not provide universities a minimum amount of funding per academic for research that exceeds the average academic salary. If (a2) were not true then e¤ectively universities are so badly funded that no university could deliver even the lowest quality research while meeting the minimum teaching quality threshold.
An implication of assumptions (a1) and (a2) is that we need to partition the analysis into two sets of cases of funding (see Figure 1 ). Set A represents situations where w p t < < w, while set B comprises the cases where < w p t . 9 The interpretation of these two conditions is as follows: 1=t is the number of students an academic can teach while achieving minimum quality, so p=t is the amount of money the university receives per academic for teaching at minimum quality. Hence, cases belonging to set A arise when the money for teaching is more than su¢ cient to cover the gap between academic salaries and the minimum payment per academic for research (p=t > w ); set B arises when the funding for teaching is not su¢ cient to cover the gap between academic salaries and the required funds for research. In the Appendix we provide a detailed characterisation of these cases, while in the next section we discuss their implications. 10 
The Trade-o¤between Teaching and Research
Consider what happens when the budget constraint, (4), holds as a strict inequality. This happens when the research quality q o¤ered by a university lies in the interior of the relevant quality intervals; in other words, there is a potential surplus of funding (see Figure 1 and also relevant …gures in the Appendix).
There are two possibilities:
(i) A university is achieving a given quality q of research, is teaching at minimum quality t, but is accumulating a surplus that it is using to build up resources.
(ii) A university is achieving a given quality q of research but could be teaching at above minimum quality t, so as to just break even. In fact we de…ne t(q) t as the maximum teaching quality achievable by a university when its research quality is q and it is just breaking even. This is given by
and describes an e¢ ciency frontier (EF) in (t; q) space that can be plotted for each of the cases we have identi…ed. In what follows, we graph this frontier and discuss its implications. In the discussion that follows we assume that universities can freely choose where to locate on the e¢ ciency frontier depending on their speci…c !.
the research elite 11 The e¢ ciency frontier that this funding case generates is shown in Figure 2 . This case is interesting because there is a unique value of !, ! 0 , say, such that a university with this speci…c characteristic maximising its objective 12 will produce a double tangency at, say q 0 and q 0 , where q 0 lies on …rst hump of the e¢ ciency frontier (EF) and so q 0 < q , and q 0 lies on second hump and so q 0 > q. No university will operate with q between q 0 and q 0 . Those universities with lower weight to research than ! 0 will choose q < q 0 , while those with higher weight to research than ! 0 will choose q > q 0 .
So this funding case produces two discretely di¤erent groups of universityone group below the funding threshold, q, and one above it (the latter is the 'research elite'). Surprisingly there will be no universities close to the quality funding threshold. The explanation for the existence/sorting of the two groups lies entirely in di¤erences in preferences over ! 1 1 For details see case A1 in the Appendix. 1 2 Given homothetic utility functions of the form we have assumed, indi¤erence curves are straight lines with slope !=(1 !).
the flat system 13 The e¢ ciency frontier that this case produces is shown in Figure 3 . This case is also interesting because this is precisely the frontier that is produced if there are no research incentives ( = 0). In this instance universities are expected to spread themselves across the frontier (EF). The only reason for bunching would be if preferences were bunched -say there was a kind of 'binary divide'with some institutions ordered to give a high weight to teaching and the others to research. tt Figure 3 : A Flat System the binary divide 14 The e¢ ciency frontier that this produces is shown in Figure 4 . To see the implications of this, consider the convex hull of the e¢ ciency frontier. There are two instances. The …rst one is where the teaching quality when q = 0 is higher than the maximum on the right hand portion of the frontier. In this instance the convex hull will consist of most of the downward sloping part of right hand portion plus a little bit of the left hand portion. Essentially the convex hull is very similar to the case of the 'research elite' above. Once again two discrete groups of universities will form: those that do no research at all and those that do, i.e., a sort of stark 'binary divide' emerges across institutions. 1 3 For details see case A2 in the Appendix. 1 4 For details see case A3 in the Appendix.
The second case (not shown) is where the teaching quality at q = 0 is no higher than the maximum on the right hand portion of the frontier. Here the convex hull is just all of the downward sloping part of the right-hand side of the frontier plus a horizontal line at the maximum. Now all universities would be spread around the right hand portion of the frontier, and there would be no discretely di¤erent groups. We are now in a position to address the question of what happens when the funding mechanism increasingly rewards research quality. This is an interesting issue for two reasons. The …rst is that it allows us to compare university systems in general across countries; the second is that it allows us to examine what has happened (and may continue to happen) over time within any one country.
Suppose we start with a completely ‡at system in which universities are funded for teaching students and receive a block grant per academic to support research and scholarship (Figure 3 , 'the ‡at system'). The analysis predicts that, while there may be the odd university that focuses almost wholly on teaching and whose research quality is modest, the vast majority will be moderately good at both teaching and research, but there will be few doing world-class quality research. In such a higher education system academics are absorbers of ideas rather than their creators. If we then introduce a premium for research quality, this can only be funded, given the overall …scal balance, by a reduction in the block grant element. It may also require a university to achieve some threshold level of research quality before the premium is paid. What results now is a university system in which there is a bifurcation: a small research elite emerges while the bulk of institutions are strong in teaching and solid, if uninspiring, research ('the research elite', …gure 2); this can delineate a sort of emerging 'culture'where universities on the one side of the frontier cannot move easily to the other, they are rather con…ned to their primary role of teaching or research not being allowed to run a signi…cant de…cit to cross over . If we further increase the steepness of the reward function for research quality, we end up with the kind of system that existed in the UK prior to 1992. In other words, the 'binary divide' is restored and we observe one set of the higher education institutions concentrating on teaching and doing minimal research and the remainder doing high-quality (most likely internationally-rated) research ('the binary divide', …gure 4). Between these two groups a gap in the research quality spectrum opens up in which there are no institutions present. This lack of research spectrum might be problematic depending on the type and sort of research it represents.
Indeed, the 'lacking' research might be extremely valuable for policy say, but is not much valued by researchers in terms of its quality. Thus in one group of universities, academics are so busy teaching, they do not have the time to think about policy and, in the other group, the academics are so busy trying to deliver research at the frontiers of knowledge, they have neither the time for nor the interest in it. 15 In summary, both the 'research elite'and the 'binary divide'cases describe incentivised education systems that generate multiple outcomes in the sense of two discretely di¤erent types of university emerging. In all three cases the funds available for teaching per academic (p=t) are more than su¢ cient to cover the di¤erence between salary, w, and block grant, , received. The non-incentivised ‡at system system arises when the research quality threshold is above the research quality associated with the minimum teaching quality and a binding budget constraint with incentives absent (q >q). The incentivised systems obtain: (i) when the research funding scheme is relatively strong ( > 0 ) and q >q or (ii) for any research funding scheme when the research quality threshold is below the research quality associated with the minimum teaching quality and a binding budget constraint were incentives absent (q <q). Hence, the design and characteristics of the university funding system (as captured by the budget constraint) are determining in the manner that we have described a 'culture':
an incentivised system gives rise to a 'research elite'co-existing with universities performing no (or minimal) research but all universities are providing at least the minimum teaching quality; a non-incentivised system by its nature leads to less polarisation. 16 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have taken some …rst steps in modelling the way in which higher education funding systems can generate university 'cultures'. The important elements in the modelling framework are as follows: (1) we have recognised that universities are principally concerned about the quality of teaching and research;
(2) we have endogenised the choice by a university of its actual selection of teaching and research quality; (3) we have taken explicit account of the fact that research and teaching has to be performed by academics who face a time constraint; and (4) we have explicitly modelled the quality of teaching and research. Understanding how these interact matters if we are to be able to assess the implications of making higher education funding systems depend on indicators of teaching and research quality. What we have shown is that, by varying the key parameters of the public funding system, a range of university 'cultures'can be generated and this seems to o¤er a theoretical framework for empirical cross-country comparisons and for policy advice. 
This is illustrated in Figure A1 . 
where (6) is just the slope of the LHS of (4) evaluated at q 0 and set equal to 
Set B Cases: a < w p=t
It turns out that there is just one general case, though, as in case A3 above, this divides into two sub-cases. We can once again de…ne 0 and q 0 as the solutions to equations (5) and (6) . In order to ensure that assumption (a2) is satis…ed we need to impose that > 0 . It is still true that equation (5) has two solutions: q 2 ; q 3 , with q < q 2 < q 3 . So there are just two sub-cases:
Case B(a) Here q 3 < 1. This arises when 0 < < w 1 q . Then the set of values of q that satisfy (4) comprises the interval [ q 2 ; q 3 ]. Figure A4 illustrates.
Case B(b)
Here q 3 1. This arises when 
